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Abstract—We report on a highly efficient information rec-
onciliation protocol for the binary symmetric channel (BSC) 
with feedback, proposed to be used in the context of secret-key 
agreement. This is a variant of the so-called Cascade protocol. 
Simulations determine efficiencies, defined by the ratio of actual 
transmitted information to the necessary amount of information, 
of approximately 1.025 for a frame length of 214 bits and a frame 
error rate of typically 10-4. The proposed algorithm works for 
any BSC parameter between 0 and 0.5. 
bits do not contain additional information. Unfortunately, we 
are not aware of how to calculate this number during or 
after reconciliation without compromising the throughput of 
an IR protocol1. Therefore, we resort to using the number 
of transmitted bits in one direction2 as an upper bound for 
the number of leaked bits and thus minimize the number of 
transmitted bits. As shown in Section VII-A, for most cases 
this upper bound is quite close to the actual number of linear 
independent bits. 
I . INTRODUCTION 
We provide an algorithm and an analysis of it for the 
following information reconciliation (IR) problem: 
Let X and Y be binary random variables (RV) belonging 
to two parties, named Alice and Bob, respectively. We assume 
that Pr[X = 0] = Pr[X = 1] = ^ and that Y results from 
the transmission of X over a binary symmetric channel with 
crossover probability p, denoted by BSC(p). The parties have 
observed the vectors x, y G {0,1}™ which are the outcomes of 
n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) instances of 
X and Y, respectively. Alice and Bob are allowed to exchange 
an arbitrary number of messages over a noiseless channel and 
perform local computations to reconcile Bob’s vector. Finally, 
Bob shall have obtained an estimate x of Alice’s vector x such 
that the error probability e := P r {x = x } is negligible [1]. 
This problem typically occurs in secret-key agreement over 
noisy channels, and particularly in quantum key distribution 
[1]. Therefore, in addition to having a low error probability e, 
the amount of information disclosed about x that leaks on the 
noiseless channel, and the computational effort should be as 
small as possible. 
A. Information Leakage 
For any information reconciliation protocol in the context of 
secret-key agreement, a key figure is the amount of informa-
tion that leaks to a potential eavesdropper during the execution 
of the protocol. Obviously, this number should be as small as 
possible, but often its exact determination is not possible and 
the number of transmitted bits is used as an upper bound. In 
some cases this estimate can, however, be improved. For exam-
ple, in case that m linearly dependent parities are transmitted, 
the number m* of linearly independent parities is clearly a 
sharper bound, since m* < m and linear combinations of 
B. General Notes 
Note that our problem to reconcile y to x is identical to 
finding the error word x © y, where the binary operator © 
denotes X O R (sum modulo 2). Thus to simplify the description 
of our analysis we assume that Alice has transmitted the all-
zero vector x = 0 and analyze how she can locate all 1’s in 
Bob’s vector through only the exchange of parities. 
I I . THEORETICAL BOUNDS 
Recently, the I R problem in the finite block length case 
without feedback has been studied [4]-[6] and the following 
lower bound for the necessary amount of information m sent 
over the noise-free channel has been obtained [6] 
> H(X\Y) + V —— (f) ~ 1 (A log2 n 
2n 
O 1 
n 
(1) 
where <&(x) is the cumulative standard normal distribution,3 H 
is the conditional entropy, and V is the channel dispersion. For 
discrete memoryless channels (DMC) under variable-length 
coding it is known that feedback does not increase the capacity 
C [7] nor the e-capacity4 [8], but that feedback in the finite 
block length case completely eliminates the term involving 
Gaussian elimination is one method to calculate the rank; asymptotically it 
requires the same number of algebraic operations as matrix multiplication [2]. 
Note that, for an eavesdropper that has observed all messages on the 
noiseless channel from Alice to Bob, the messages that are transmitted from 
Bob to Alice provide no further information on Alice’s vector x. See also 
endnote [28] in [3]. 
Often Q(x) := 1 — <&(x) and the relation <&- 1 (1 — e) = Q- 1(e) is used. 
The e-capacity is defined as the capacity when an error probability e is 
tolerated. 
rri 
n 
the channel dispersion [8]: for every D M C codes exist that 
use feedback and achieve block error rates e with rates 
C /log n\ 
R = O . (2) 
1 — e n 
We are not aware of any theoretical result concerning 
bounds on m for finite-length I R with variable-length feed-
back, however it seems reasonable that a relation similar to 
Eq. (2), i.e. without the dispersion V wil l hold. The algorithm 
proposed here will indeed strengthen this conjecture. 
I I I . EFFICIENCY MEASURES 
In the following we introduce several measures of efficiency 
for an information reconciliation protocol over the BSC(p). As 
first measure, the efficiency can be defined as the percentage 
of additional information disclosed over the Shannon limit, 
i.e. the ratio of the number of transmitted bits m and the 
(asymptotic) minimum of the leakage, nH(X\Y) = nh(p), 
m 
ViR = / ; (3) 
nhyp) 
where h(p) denotes the binary Shannon entropy function given 
by h(p) := —plog2 p — (1 — p) log2( l — p). 
The reconciliation efficiency can be also defined as the ratio 
of the maximal length of the secret key (taking into account 
the leakage m) and the capacity of the BSC(p) 
1 — m/n 
PIR = T - (4) 
1 — hyp) 
Note that, in general r/m > 1 and /3m < 1, and the equality 
holds in both cases for perfect reconciliation. Both measures 
r/iR and /3m are related by 
1 — ViR^ip) = PiR (1 — h(p)) • (5) 
Further note that these measures are acceptable given that 
we are typically interested in very low error probabilities e. 
However, as motivated by Eqs. (1) and (2), the error proba-
bility must be generally taken into account. In this regard, we 
additionally report here: (i) the block error probability e, i.e. 
the ratio of frame pairs (x, x) with x ^ x after reconciliation, 
and (ii) the bit error probability e&, i.e. the average ratio of 
different bits in both frames. 
I V . T H E C A S C A D E PROTOCOL 
We provide first a description of the original Cascade 
algorithm and some modified versions. 
A. The Original Protocol 
In what follows we restate the Cascade protocol [1] in 
the language of linear block codes. 
Cascade works in successive passes. At the beginning of 
pass i, Alice and Bob agree on the parity-check (PC) matrix 
H i of a linear code with constant row weight fcj, such that each 
bit is covered by exactly one PC equation. Then Alice and Bob 
exchange the corresponding syndromes, H;x and H;y, and for 
each different syndrome bit they perform a dichotomic search5 
(by exchanging further parities) to localize a bit error. After all 
errors positions are located Bob flips the corresponding bits in 
y such that the syndromes of Alice and Bob are now identical. 
They either stop the protocol or start a new pass with a new 
(random) PC matrix that covers different and larger sets of 
bits in each PC row. 
In the original description of Cascade the row weights fcj 
of the PC matrices H ; were chosen as follows. Based on an 
estimate p of the channel parameter p the row weight in the 
first pass is k\ = [0.73/p], where [ ] denotes the nearest integer. 
In following passes the row weight is doubled, fcj = 2fcj_i. 
From the second pass onward, each detected error can 
be used to correct further errors in other already completed 
passes. Let us suppose that an error is detected during the 
second pass. Since in the first pass all PCs are satisfied, it 
means that this bit error was in the first pass covered by an odd 
number of additional bit errors and thus it remains undetected 
by the PC equation. Consequently, there must be at least a 
second error in the bits covered by that PC equation and it 
can be now corrected by additional dichotomic searches. Since 
every bit participates in exactly one PC row in every pass, 
if an error is detected in pass i this uncovers errors in all 
passes 1 , . . . , i — 1. Note that dichotomic searches are shorter 
for earlier passes, thus the cascade process should start always 
from the first pass continuing until pass i — l. Further note that 
since (and as long as) the dichotomic searches corresponding 
to different PC rows are independent, in each pass, these can 
be processed and communicated in parallel. 
Finally, the protocol concludes when four passes have 
been completed. These four passes are empirically enough to 
remove “all” discrepancies in a frame of 104 bits lengths [3]. 
B. Earlier Improvements of the Cascade Protocol 
Recently we have reported a detailed analysis and review 
of the Cascade protocol and its modifications [3]. Previous 
to [3] the main ideas for improving the protocol have been: 
(i) to optimize the row weights fcj and the number of passes, 
(ii) to replace the random construction of PC equations, (iii) 
to not include corrected bits in PC equations (that leads to 
a more accurate splitting into two PC equations covering the 
same number of potentially wrong bits) during the dichotomic 
searches, and (iv) to reuse PC equations where Alice and Bob 
have the same syndrome bit. In [3] a thorough numerical 
analysis based on simulations for the mentioned modifica-
tions has been provided. Focus was also put on accurately 
simulating the resulting block error probability e of each 
variant. In addition, based on simulations it was observed in 
[3] that previous modifications of the row weights missed the 
They (i) split the corresponding PC equation in two non-overlapping PC 
equations (they split the check node of the corresponding Tanner graph), (ii) 
calculate the parity of x and y corresponding to the first new PC equation, and 
(iii) exchange both parities. If the parities differ they continue their splitting 
and parity exchange in the first PC equation. Otherwise, there is an odd 
number of errors in set of bits covered by the second PC equation and they 
continue their splitting and parity exchange there. The parties continue until 
they have located the exact position of a bit error in at most [ log2 hi) steps. 
most important point: the optimal efficiency is achieved using 
powers-of-two row weights, i.e. fcj = 2Ki. In combination 
with an optimization of Ki for p from 1% to 11% efficiencies 
r/jfi w 1.04 . . . 1.06 (corresponding to /3JR pa 0.997... 0.94) 
could be achieved for a frame length of n = 216. 
V. O N THE OPTIMAL EFFICIENCY OF C A S C A D E 
As commented above, recently we realized that the effi-
ciency of Cascade significantly improves using parity-check 
weights that are powers of two [3]. A deeper understanding of 
this fact was, however, not known. Below we develop some 
ideas that help us understand this improvement. 
Rule 1. To reconcile with a number of transmitted bits close to 
the theoretical minimum of nh(p), we shall transmit (mostly) 
bits that contain (almost) one bit of information. 
Equivalently, the conditional probability of (most) trans-
mitted bits to be a one given the values of all previously 
transmitted bits must be (close to) \. 
Let the message T be the R V formed by the concatenation of 
all transmitted bits X i , . . . , Tm. The length m of T is minimal 
if T is incompressible, i.e. m — 1 < H(T) < m. 
Note that for the BSC(p), H(T) > nh(p). Let us first 
assume that H(T) = m. Then, since H(M) = H(Xi) + 
^2T=2 H(Xk\Xi .. .Xk-i), all (conditional) entropies on the 
right hand side (there are m of them) must be equal to one, and 
all conditional probabilities Pr[Xfc = l |X i .. .Xk-i] = \. 
On the other hand if we transmit bits with conditional 
probabilities q ^  \, we transmit with each bit only h(q) bits of 
information and we will need to transmit \nh(p)/h(q)~\ bits. 
A. Proof of Optimality of Dichotomic Searches on 2K-Checks 
With Odd Parity 
Let the term £-check denote a parity-check row of weight 
t. The parity of a binary vector x with respect to (w.r.t.) a 
parity-check row h is the inner product h • x (taken mod 2). 
Let us assume we have a vector x that consists of i.i.d. bits 
Xi with Pr[xi = 1] = p, 0 < p < ^. Further assume we have 
a 2n-check h, which splits into two disjoint n-checks h' and 
h" , i.e. h = h' © h". Then, for all values of n if x has odd 
parity w.r.t. h (h • x = 1) we get (using the symmetry in h' 
and h") that 
Since both cases have probabilities different from one half 
the information contained in h' • x (or h " • x) is always smaller 
than one bit. Here 
1 + (1 — 2p)n 
Peven(n,P) '•= Pr[h • x = 0J = , and (8) 
1 — (1 — 2p)n 
Podd(n,p) := Pr|h • x = 1J = (9) 
denote the probabilities that x has even or odd parity w.r.t. an 
n-check h, respectively. 
Similarly, we can proof that any splitting of (2n +1)-checks 
with odd or even parity leads for p ^  ^ always to conditional 
probabilities different from one half and thus results in parities 
with less than one bit of information. 
So far we have seen that splitting 2n-checks with odd 
parities w.r.t. x into two n-checks is the only case where we 
gain exactly one bit of information (cf. Eq. (6)). If we want 
to continue this optimal splitting until we end up with two 1-
checks, by induction we need to start with a 2K-check (where 
K is a positive integer) with odd parity w.r.t. x. • 
V I . IMPROVED PROTOCOL 
As we already reported in [3], starting with a frame of 214 
bits and using only 2K-checks could significantly improve the 
efficiency T/IR of Cascade (typically from 1.15 to 1.05). 
However, since the efficiency is still larger than unity, there 
must be further ways to improve this. In the following we give 
first an overview of where Cascade still “leaks” too much 
information, and second we describe how to fix it. 
A. Optimize Initial Check Weights 
Previously, all reported implementations of Cascade have 
used for the first pass k\ -checks where k\ < 2/p, and most 
of them used k\ < l/p. However, note that peven(«-,p) and 
Podd(n}p), cf. Eqs. (8) and (9), are both approaching ^ with 
increasing n. Thus, in general, larger PC weights in the 
first round should be better (cf. Rule 1). However, this rule 
interferes with the rule of the next section: making PC weights 
too large reduces the advantage of the next step. In contrast our 
numerical simulation resulted in the following optimal check 
weights for the first pass: 
Pr[h' • x = 1 A h" • x = 0|h • x = 1] = 
Pr[h' • x = 0 A h" • x = l |h • x = 1] = 
fei = 
min(2^ ^2\-vp}\ TI12) if z> ^ 0.25 
min(m£ix(l 2^  2^\^ -/PJI -M ri/2) if z> >^ 0.25. (10) 
(6) 
Consequently, the parity h' • x (or equivalently the parity 
h " • x) carries exactly /i f i ) = 1 bit of information about x, 
which is the optimal case. 
If x has even parity w.r.t. h (h • x = 0) we have 
Pr[h' • x = 0 A h" • x = 0|h • x = 0] = 
Pr[h' • x = 1 Ah" • x = l |h • x = 0] = 
p2even(n,p) 1 
> peven(2n,p) 2 
p2odd(n,p) 1 
< 
peven(2n,p) 2 (7) 
Note, the min function limits the check weight to half the 
vector length, the max function avoids check weights smaller 
than one. Note also, that for p > 0.355 the optimal check 
weight is one, i.e. the complete vector is transmitted on the 
noiseless channel. 
B. Group Bits According to Conditional Probability 
We wil l have a closer look at the iterative bisection of 2 K -
checks with odd parity w.r.t x . Note that after the first bisection 
step we obtain a 2K-1-check with even parity and a 2 K - 1 -
check with odd parity. The 2K-1-check with odd parity wi l l 
itself be further divided into a 2K-2-check with even parity 
and a 2K~2-check with odd parity. This process continues by 
dividing the check with odd parity unti l we finally divide a 
2-check with odd parity. 
Consequently, after the last step we have obtained from the 
original 2K-check with odd parity a set of 2K -checks (for all 
K' € {I,..., K — 1} we obtain exactly one PC) that all have 
even parity and two definitely known single bits which have 
the values 0 and 1 (or 1 and 0), respectively. In addition we 
have the set of 2K-checks that had even parity in the first pass 
and had not been divided. 
Now, after the first pass the standard Cascade algorithm 
continues by creating PC rows with larger weight covering 
randomly selected bits, calculating parities, dividing PC with 
odd parities, and performing dichotomic searches to localize 
further errors. However, already the first step (selecting bit 
positions randomly) is definitely non-optimal as we w i l l show 
in the following. 
Note, that the conditional probability that a bit in a £-check 
(with i.i.d. bits) wi th even parity is an error bit does strongly 
depend on the PC weight t 
Poddit — l ,p ) 
Pbit\t,P h • X = 0) = p . (11) 
Peven(*,W 
Therefore, when selecting bits randomly for each new pass 
we “forget” that we have already learned in previous passes, 
i.e. that bits in PC of larger weight with even parity are (much) 
more likely wrong than bits in PC with smaller weight with 
even parity. In other words we destroy information. 
To be able to transmit bits that have (almost) one bit 
of information (cf. Eq. (6)), we transform the non-uniform 
distribution to a set of distributions that are each uniform but 
with different bit error probabilities. After the first pass we 
construct bit groups BJC>: one group for each K' G { 1 , . . . , K} 
that consists of all bits checked by all 2K -checks (recall 
that after the first pass all PC have even parity), and another 
bit group that contains all single bits with values which are 
already definitely known. We have now obtained K different 
bit groups that can contain errors, each one consisting of 
bits with the same a-posteriori error probability that we can 
calculate according to Eq. (11). 
In the second pass we adapt the PC weight k2,K' for each 
bit group BJC> as 
ki,K' = min(2[log2(4/pbit(2 >plh-x=°))]; |B K , | / 2 ) , (12) 
and create random PC patterns for each bit group separately. 
C. Perform Bisection on the Smallest of All Possible Checks 
Let us assume that in i-th pass the dichotomic search has 
located a bit error. This error can be tracked back to exactly 
one PC equation per previous pass, i.e. by flipping the error bit 
it produces i—l PC with odd parity. Potentially, we have found 
i—l additional bit errors. However, note that it is possible that 
two or more PC equations contain the same bit error given that 
these PC are all f rom different passes. 
In any case we have to decide how we should continue 
with the processing. I f we want to minimize the number of 
transmitted bits i t is necessary to bisect the smallest of all 
P C with odd parity, which could belong to any of the passes, 
f rom 1 to i — 1, let us say pass i!. Bisecting this P C results in 
another localized bit error. Again this error is corrected in all 
other i — l passes. We potentially obtain i — l new bit errors 
and their corresponding P C with odd parity. However, as the 
process continues, it may also happen that P C with odd parity 
are affected and toggled back to even parity. 
Let us for a moment concentrate on the simplest case, pass 
2. I f we localize an error in a P C of pass 2 we can correct 
the error in some 2K -check of pass 1. This P C now has odd 
parity. Note that, one bit out of 2K bits is already exactly 
known before the dichotomic search. Nevertheless, we start 
a standard dichotomic search, however, we take care not to 
transmit redundant information. (see Section V I - D ) . 
D. Reducing Redundant Information 
Another improvement above the standard (state-of-the-art) 
Cascade consists in keeping a list of all frame bits which 
are already known to be correct. Whenever we correct an 
erroneous bit (which has been located by a previous bisection), 
we know that the bit is now definitely correct (it cannot 
happen in the Cascade algorithm that an already correct bit 
is toggled), thus we can add it to the list of known correct bits. 
Additionally, whenever we do a bisection of an odd P C , we 
learn the parity sums of the two halves of the P C . I f the half 
wi th parity 0 consists only of a single bit, we can also add this 
bit to the list of correct bits. We can use this list of correct 
bits in the fol lowing manner: Whenever we do a bisection of 
an odd P C , we would in principle have to calculate the parity 
sum of one half of the P C (the parity sum of the other half is 
then also known, since the whole P C has odd parity). Before 
we do this, we can check i f one of the halves consists only 
of bits which are already in the list of known correct bits. 
I f this is the case, we know the parities of both halves and 
do not need to transmit any parity bit and can immediately 
proceed with bisecting the half wi th odd parity. The same can 
be done at the beginning of the i-th pass, when we start wi th 
calculating the parity sums over P C of size fcj. For each P C 
we can check i f it consists only of already known correct bits, 
and i f it does we do not need to transmit it. 
I f we use bit groups (cf. Section V I - B ) in the second pass, 
we know that the parity sum of each bit group is even. Thus 
after new PCs are formed the parity of the last P C in each 
group is redundant and need not be transmitted. 
V I I . S I M U L A T I O N R E S U L T S 
Simulations were performed to cover the range of the 
channel parameter p f rom 0.01 up to 0.5. This is in contrast 
to previous studies that typically concentrate only on p G 
[0,0.11], the interval mainly of interest for discrete variable 
Q K D protocols, such as the well-known B B 8 4 protocol [9]. 
Random bit frames were generated simulating independent 
Bernoulli processes with success probability p. Simulations 
have been comprehensively computed to accurately estimate 
the reconciliation efficiency, r/m and /3m, frame error rate, 
e, and bit error rate, e&. To calculate those quantities we have 
simulated 105 frames for n = 210 and n = 214 and 104 frames 
for n = 216. 
Fig. 1 shows the average reconciliation efficiency of the 
original Cascade [1] (black), the optimized version proposed 
in [3] (green) and the modified protocol proposed here (blue). 
Two frame lengths of n = 214 bits (solid lines) and n = 216 
bits (dashed lines) were considered. As shown in Fig. 1, the 
efficiency of the modified protocol proposed here improves 
the values reported in [3] for the region of interest in QKD 
(zoomed area), but even more interesting is that it does not 
degenerate for greater values of p. 
1 I l I l I l I l I z ^ 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Crossover probability p 
Fig. 1. Average reconciliation efficiency for the BSC(p). 
Table I summarizes the efficiency, as defined in Eqs. (3) 
and (4), of the proposed reconciliation protocol together 
with the average block error probability for some remarkable 
crossover probabilities and several frame lengths. 
T A B L E I 
EFFICIENCY VALUES, FRAME A N D B I T ERROR RATES. 
n 
2il) 
2lO 
2lO 
2 l 4 
2 l 4 
2 l 4 
2 l 6 
2 l 6 
2 l 6 
P 
0.03 
0.1 
0.3 
0.03 
0.1 
0.3 
0.03 
0.1 
0.3 
f}IR 
1.105 
1.064 
1.0466 
1.025 
1.0263 
1.0254 
1.0185 
1.023 
1.024 
Pi R 
0.9747 
0.9433 
0.9223 
0.994 
0.9768 
0.8116 
0.9955 
0.9798 
0.822 
e 
1 6 Y 1 0 - 4 
2 3 y 1 0 - 4 
6 X 10 - 5 
1 4 y 1 0 - 4 
4 X 10 - 5 
5 y 1 0 - 5 
1 y 1 0 - 4 
0 
0 
eb 
0.00146 
0.00376 
0.00208 
0.0029 
0.00466 
0.0026 
0.0002 
0 
0 
A. Actual Leakage vs Number of Transmitted Bits 
Given that we perform several random selections it may 
occur that a transmitted parity is linearly dependent on already 
transmitted parities. In such case, the actual information that 
the eavesdropper gets from this linear dependent bit is zero. 
Consequently, the leakage is bounded from above by the 
number of linear independent parities which is the rank over 
GF(2) of the binary matrix formed by all parity-check equa­
tions including also the dichotomic searches. Our simulations 
indicate that for values of the channel parameter satisfying 
p < 0.1 the quotient of the number of transmitted bits and the 
number of linearly independent bits is at the order of 1.001, 
and for larger values of p this quotient is smaller than 1.01, 
even for short frame lengths. 
V I I I . CONCLUSIONS 
We have proposed and simulated an improved information 
reconciliation protocol with feedback that is well suited for the 
secret-key agreement problem. A previous observation on the 
optimality of using powers of two for the weights of the parity-
checks in the Cascade protocol was motivated here for the 
first time. In additi n, our analysis paved the way for a set of 
additional improvements that helped to increase the efficiency 
of Cascade. For a frame length of 214 the proposed protocol 
notably achieves an efficiency below TJIR < 1.03 in the 
range p € [0.02,0.5]. This closed approximately half of the 
previously remaining gap to an efficiency of unity at the 
beginning of the range, but also remarkably, the efficiency 
remains constant for higher values of p. 
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